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This paper examines differences in strategy for new product
development at the firm level as well as the impact on market performance
by analyzing 223 new car products introduced at 21 automobile
manufacturers between 1980 and 1990. The results: Differences in
market share growth correlate strongly with new product rates and
average design ages of products. Japanese firms led in these areas and
utilized a different inter-project strategy, with rapid design transfers
among multiple projects. European firms had fewer new products but
newer designs. U.S. firms did not develop many new products or
designs, and performed worst in the market.
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1. Introduction
Since the management of new product development has become a central issue
in global competition, numerous academic researchers in recent years have
undertaken studies of how effective and efficient projects have been in various
industries. Mostof theempirical research has focused on managerial or organizational
approaches as well as performance measures for individual projects (Imai et al., 1985;
Henderson, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Cusumano, 1991). At the same time,
there are various reports that Japanese manufacturers tend to develop new products
much more frequently than U.S. or European competitors and that this has been one
of the major reasons, along with manufacturing skills, for their strong performance
in global markets (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Dertouzos et al., 1988; Womack et al.,
1990). But researchers have not yet studied in depth the management of multiple new-
product development efforts over time at the firm level. This is important because,
while high levels of engineering productivity in individual projects may contribute to
making a firm overall more efficient in product development, to develop a successful
stream of new products over many years, as well as to take advantage of designs and
components in more than one product without compromising the final products
unnecessarily, requires some degree of planning and coordination above the level of
the individual project.
In industries where manufacturers offer multiple products to the market and
undertake multiple projects in parallel, such as with automobiles, new product
development strategies and organizations must take at least two elements into
consideration. First, they need to plan for the frequency of new development
projects, both to replace existing products and to expand the breadth of available
product lines (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Miller, 1988; Kekre and Srinivasan,
1990; von Braun, 1991). This frequency becomes an important competitive dimension
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because some manufacturers appear to be much more prolific in their new product
introductions than others. Secondly, firms need to plan how related they want
products to be, such as in terms of components or design features, and manage the
coordination process among multiple projects as necessary. For example, some
manufacturers develop an extensive number of different products that share the same
basic design, while others prefer to use unique designs more often in each of their
different new products (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Womack et al. 1990). These
differences may reflect decisions made above the project level, yet they affect not on ly
the project organizations but also a firm's competitiveness. Nonetheless, there has
been little empirical research that explores the interrelationship of these factors and
their impact on either market or organizational performance.
This paper examines these differences in strategy for new product development
at the firm level, as well as the impact on market performance, by analyzing 223 new
car products introduced at 21 automobile manufacturers between 1980 and 1990. The
next section presents a brief review of past studies of new product development in the
auto industry to highlight what conclusions researchers have drawn as well as what
areas have yet to be studied in depth. The third section then proposes a framework
to analyze inter-project strategies. The last two sections describe the sample and
measures used to explore the impact of inter-project strategy on market performance,
and then discuss the results of the data analysis.
2. Recent Studies of New Auto Product Development
Numerous studies in recent years have examined differences in strategy,
structure and performance for new product development among worldwide auto
manufacturers (see Cusumano and Nobeoka 1991 for a detailed review of this
literature). In particular, Clark and Fujimoto at Harvard University and the
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International Motor Vehicle Program at MIT have found several important differences
in management and performance among Japanese, U.S. and European manufacturers
(Clark et al., 1987; Sheriff, 1988; Womack et al., 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).
Clark and Fujimoto conducted the most thorough study, focusing on 29 projects from
22 producers. They concluded that the Japanese firms, in general, were better at new
product development as measured by design quality, lead time, and productivity
defined by engineering hours. Among volume producers, three factors also
contributed to better project performance: heavier program manager responsibility,
higher supplier involvement in engineering, and more overlapping between stages
such as product planning, product engineering, and process engineering.
Clark elaborated on these data in a 1989 paper that focused on the result
showing that Japanese projects used more unique parts than U.S. or European firms,
which theoretically may increase design quality but also add time and cost in
development, unless fitting old parts into new designs creates additional coordination
that increases engineering time (Clark, 1989). He concluded that Japanese projects
had more unique parts and higher engineering productivity than their U.S. and
European counterparts primarily because they made more extensive use of suppliers.
Since Clark and Fujimoto's sample consisted of one or two projects from each
firm, they limited their study to a project-level analysis and comparisons, with
statistical analysis, of regional averages for Japanese, European, and U.S.
producers. Therefore, it is difficult from this sample to generalize about the linkage
between project-level performance and firm-level performance in the marketplace.
Nor were they able to explore the potential impact of different inter-project strategies
and management approaches on organizational and market performance.
As part of the MIT study, Sheriff measured differences in the frequency of new
product introductions and average project complexity for 25 major auto man ufactu rers
5
between 1982 and 1987 (Sheriff, 1988; also reported in Womack et al., 1990). Project
complexity was calculated through an index that assigned weights to changes made in
major exterior, interior, and platform components, with adjustments upward for each
additional body style or wheelbase variation. These data confirmed that Japanese
firms introduced new products much more frequently than U.S. or European firms.
As a result, the Japanese firms maintained much newer products in the market and
increased the number of product offerings during this period. In addition, Sheriff's
measurements showed that the Eu ropean projects had the highest average complexity,
followed by the Japanese and then the U.S. producers. Fujimoto and Sheriff then
compared their data to explore interrelationships and found positive correlations
between productivity measures such as lead time as well as engineering hours at the
project level and the performance variables at the firm level (Fujimoto and Sheriff,
1989). They also found a positive correlation between the rate of new product
introductions and market-share growth, although this paper did not explore the
impact of project complexity on market performance.
The purpose of our study is build on this research and explore product-
development strategy and performance at the firm level. The underlying hypothesis
is that, apart from differences in productivity or lead time for individual projects,
differences in inter-project strategy and management can significantly influence how
efficient and effective an entire firm is in new product development.
3. Firm-Level New Product Strategy and Inter-Project Strategy
Large automobile manufacturers have several product lines and constantly
develop new products to replace existing products or to add new product lines. There
are two basic considerations that determine how product lines evolve within firms: the
frequency of new product introductions, and the way different projects interact or
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relate to each other in design engineering. Our research framework consists of two
approaches to examine these dimensions. First, we define variables critical to
measure firm-wide new-product development outputs during a fixed period, which
include the new product rate, average design age, and average Intro-project
variation. Second, we develop a typology of inter-project strategies, which
categorize the alternatives for inter-project interactions into four types.
Variables on Firm-wide Measurement of New Product Development: The new product
rate is the ratio of the number of new product introductions adjusted by the number
of product offerings in a base year. A higher new product rate makes it possible for
a fi rm to replace existing products or enter new market segments more frequently than
competitors (Miller, 1988; Fujimoto and Sheriff, 1989; Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990).
In order to increase the new product rate, however, firms need to invest more
financial and engineering resources, or decrease the average project task
requirements (complexity). Otherwise, frequent new-product introductions may
reflect incomplete development efforts and result in products that suffer from
problems in design quality and perform poorly in the market. If firms do not want to
or cannot increase their resource investments, then increasing the new product rate
requires a decrease in task requirements. As Clark (1989) illustrated, a project that
develops more new components requires more lead time and engineering hours.
Firms also have at least two choices to decrease engineering tasks for new
components: decrease the average intra-project variations or repeat the same design
among different new projects. Decreasing intra-project variations may have a
negative impact on market competitiveness because products appear similar to
consumers and lead to a reduced coverage of market segments. The repeated use of
the same design or components may also have a negative impact on market
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competitiveness, because the purpose of frequent new product introductions is to
capture changes in customer needs with new technology. Reuse of an old design may
conflict with this objective, although the rapid reuse among multiple projects of new
technology may actually improve the overall newness of a firm's product offerings.
Therefore, we can hypothesize that the negative impact on a firm's market
competitiveness should depend to some extent on the average design age of new
products introduced into the marketplace. There should be a tradeoff between
increasing the new product rate and incorporating new designs into each new
product, rather than extensively reusing the same design. Successful Japanese
automobile firms, however, appear to develop more new products without introducing
older designs than their U.S. and European counterparts. One of Clark's findings,
for example, implied that, in order to avoid this tradeoff, Japanese manufacturers
depended more on outside suppliers for new component designs (Clark, 1989). Our
study offers the hypothesis that the Japanese manufactu rers may also have different
inter-project coordination strategies from U. S. and Eu ropean manufactu rers in order
to mitigate this tradeoff. Specifically, we are interested in exploring whether
Japanese manufacturers transfer existing new designs from one project more quickly
into other projects developing new products. The next section discusses the second
part of our framework that deals with this research question.
Inter-Project Strategy: Firms have various alternatives for inter-project strategies
used in new product-development. Figure 2, which presents a typology of these
strategies, categorizes new product development projects into four types, depending
on two dimensions: the extent of changes and sources of the base design. The extent
of change differentiates a new project whether its core design is newly developed or
transferred and modified from other projects within the firm. Projects that develop
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- their -own -new--core-designs -are-categorize4 as a new design. In the latter case,
variations of the modification can be broken down into three types, depending on the
location of base design sources: either an on-going other project, an existing other
product, or the new project's predecessor product. These three types are labelled
here as concurrent design transfer, sequential design transfer, and design
modification, respectively.
New design thus refers to the development of a new product with a core design
produced primarily from scratch, without a preexisting base design. In this type of
project, there is little relatedness or interaction with any other projects within the
firm. Members of the project can concentrate cn creating a new design and a new
product. While the project's engineering task requirements should be high because
the design is new (Clark, 1989), both coordination costs and design constraints are
low because the project does not have to be coordinated with other projects or follow
design constraints derived from an existing design base.
The next two types of projects transfer and share a core design from other
projects within the firm. In the second type, concurrent design transfer, a new
project begins to transfer a core design from a base project before the base project
completes its design engineering. These two projects -- the new project and the base
project -- require extensive and potentially costly coordination because (1) they must
overlap chronologically, (2) the new project needs to incorporate a design from the
base project while the design is still relatively new, and (3) mutual adjustments in
design between the two projects are still possible and perhaps likely.
The third type, sequential design transfer, transfers a design from a base
model after the base model's development is finished. Because this type of project
basically reuses an existing design that is "off-the-shelf, " inter-project coordination
is not needed. When a new project uses the core design in this manner, however, the
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design being transferred is already relatively old, compared to designs transferred
more concurrently. In addition, design constraints may be high because mutual
adjustments between projects on the core design are no longer possible. (This
discussion of hypothetical differences between concurrent and sequential design
transfer are partially based on Thompson's distinction between "long-linked
technology" and "intensive technology," where the latter also requires mutual
adjustments and higher coordination costs. See Thompson, 1967).
The last type, design modification, refers to a new development project that
modifies a direct predecessor product as in a relatively minor model change. This type
of project does not need any inter-project coordination either, but has to consider
constraints from the core design of the current model. The difference between the
design modification and the sequential design transfer is thus the source of the base
design. While the design age in this type is determined by the base product's life
cycle and can even be older than with a sequential design transfer, modifications may
be easier than with a sequential design transfer, which transfers a core design
between different product lines. Another difference is that sequential design
transfer can be used to add a new product line, while a design modification is only for
replacement projects.
4. Sample Characteristics and Measurements
The sample in this study covers the 21 largest auto manufacturers in the world,
including seven Japanese, three U.S., and eleven European producers, and the 223
new car products they introduced between 1980 and 1990. Data on new product
development in the industry were collected from Auto Review, an annually published
industry journal that covers design features and introduction dates for all new
products worldwide. Unstructured interviews with engineers in these firms were also
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conducted when needed for clarification. As a market performance variable, following
Clark and Fujimoto (1991), we used the cumulative worldwide market (unit-
production) share growth of each manufacturer during this period. Other measures
as described below were also used as classification and performance variables.
New Product Rate, Intro-Project Variation, and Design Age: We measured the new
product rate for each manufacturer by the ratio of the number of new product
introductions between 1980 and 1990 divided by the number of product offerings in
1979. Following Sheriff (1988), we also broke down the new product rate into the
replacement rate and the expansion rate. The replacement rate measu res the ratio of
the number of new products that replaced existing products divided by the number
of product offerings in 1979. The expansion rate is the same ratio for new products
that were developed to add a product line. A sum of the replacement rate and the
expansion rate, therefore, equals the new product rate for each firm. We also
measured the change in the number of product offerings during this period as a
control variable. This variable also determines the breadth of market coverage, which
is affected not only by the expansion rate but also by withdrawal of product lines.
We defined a new product as a model designed within a single project and with
completely new interior and exterior stylings. By this definition, a new product with
minor cosmetic modifications is not counted as a new product. Product variations
designed within a single project, such as the Ford Taurus and Mercury Sable, count
as only one new product. On the other hand, we used another variable for
intra-project variation to show the average number of different body types and
stylings developed within individual projects. Whether two or more new variations
were in fact developed together within one project or separate projects is critical to
this study, because this affects the total number of new projects and the nature of
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their interrelationships. Most cases, such as the Taurus and Sable, are openly
discussed in Auto Review or other industry journals. For unclear cases we have had
to rely on interviews with company engineers.
The design age, which is the age of the core design a new project uses,
measures the difference in time between the introduction of the new product and when
the base product was first developed. For example, the design age of a new project
that develops a core design from scratch is zero. The core design used in the present
data analysis is the platform design, which determines the basic characteristics of
other majorcomponent designs, including the body and engine size, drive-train type,
and the general level of design sophistication. Designing a new platform from scratch
requires both financial and engineering resources as well as new technology. In order
to determine whether the platform of a certain new project was newly developed or
transferred from preceding products, we assigned points to the extent of changes in
platform design between the new product and preceding products similar to the new
product, based on changes in the wheelbase and tread as well as the suspension
design (see Appendix 1 for more details).
Inter-Project Strategy: As a firm-level analysis of inter-project strategies, we
classified projects done within individual firms during 1980-1990 into four
inter-project strategy types. New projects that developed new platform designs are
automatically categorized as the first type, new design, while those developing new
products based on platforms from other projects fall into one of the other three
categories. Projects that developed a new product based on the platform design of the
predecessor model are categorized as design modifications, while those which shared
platform designs with any preceding projects are either concurrent design transfers
or sequential design transfers. As indicated earlier, the distinction between
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concurrent and sequential transfers is determined by the transfer time lag, which is
the same as the design age defined above.
First, we compared the average transfer time lags for the Japanese, U.S., and
European projects that were not new designs or modifications. We then defined
concurrent design transfers as a transfer between two projects occurring within 2.0
years of the introduction of the core design. Visual analysis of a frequency
distribution for new projects indicated thatone group of projects transferred designs
within 1.25 years, while another group transferred most designs after 2.25 years
(Appendix 2). The figure 2.0 years was also the median transfer lag time for the
entire sample and is close to the midway point (2.25 years) for the average lead time
(4.52 years) for new car development as calculated by Clark and Fujimoto (1991: 73).
We also tested the sensitivity of this division by using 1.5 years and 2.5 years as
cutoff points, with no significant change in the results. In addition, we believe that
if the time lag is longer than two years, then there does not need to be much
overlapping or coordination between projects.
5. Results and Discussion
New Product Development and Market Share Growth: Table 1 shows a regression
analysis with cumulative worldwide market share growth as a dependent variable and
firm-wide measurements of new product development as independent variables. The
first model shows that new product rate and average design age significantly influence
market share growth, while either change in the number of product offerings or
average intra-project variation do not. In other words, firms that developed more
new products and, at the same time, incorporated newer core designs into their new
product development efforts tended to increase their market share. On the other
hand, merely increasing the number of product offerings by, for example, keeping
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old products available for many years, did not increase market share. It is also
significant that increasing the complexity of projects by adding variations in styling
and body types did not have a significant impact on market share either. In addition,
when adding the replacement and expansion rates instead of the new product rate in
the second model, only the replacement rate has a statistically significant impact on
market share, though both variables are associated with increases in market share.
The last two models examine regional differences. The third model, which
includes independent dummy variables for U.S. and European manufacturers,
supports earlier findings by Sheriff (1988) and Clark and Fujimoto (1991) that show
strong regional differences. Japanese manufacturers on average increased their
market share by 62%, while European firms gained only 9% and the U. S. firms declined
by 27%. Because these regional dummy variables are strongly correlated with the two
key predictor variables, no variable in the last model is statistically significant.
The regional differences are evident in Figure 2, which plots the regional
identifications along with two key determinants: the new product rate and average
design age. Japanese firms tend to be in the high new product rate/small average
design age region and gained more market share than competitors. European firms
tended to develop fewer products with newer designs. All three U.S. firms and two
European firms developed fewerproducts with olderdesigns than mostof theJapanese
firms and lost in market share. Figure 2 also suggests that European and U.S. firms,
but not Japanese firms, experienced a tradeoff between the new product rate and
average design age. This may well be because Japanese firms, which achieve both
high new product rates and new average design ages, may have different
inter-project strategies and management approaches.
Inter-Project Strategy and Regional Differences: Table 2 summarizes regional
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differences in usage of different inter-project strategy types. Three different
patterns are evident in each region. Most importantly, the average transfer lag times
for the Japanese, U.S., and European samples were 1.47, 3.46, and 2.78 years,
respectively. This reflects, we believe, that Japanese manufacturers utilized more
concurrent design transfers than European and U.S. firms, which resulted in both
higher new product rates and relatively new average design ages. In other words,
instead of developing many completely new core designs to achieve these two key
objectives, Japanese firms created a few new core designs and quickly transferred
these to other product lines, while the designs were still relatively new. Since 23% of
new projects at Japanese firms used concurrent design transfer, at least 46% of
Japanese projects may have required extensive inter-project coordination because
each concurrent transfer involves some overlapping with at least one other project
from which the core design is transferred.
The European makers are characterized by an extensive use of completely new
designs, which explains the low average design age of their new products. Even
though they developed fewer new products, by concentrating on these products, they
developed newer designs than other producers. The results of this strategy may
reflect the ratio of change in unit sales growth per product offering, which only
European manufacturers increased on average during this period. The U.S. makers
tended to have more sequential design transfers than other firms, which resulted in
older designs in their new products. Accordingly, they did not develop either as
many products as the Japanese or as many new designs as the Europeans.
6. Conclusions and Further Research
This paper proposed a frameworktoanalyze strategies formultiple new-product
development projects measured at the firm level, focusing on a theoretical
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inter-project strategy typology and empirical results that support the importance of
firm-level measurements of new product development and strategic alternatives. The
results indicate that differences in a firm's market share growth during the 1980's
correlate strongly with the firm's new product rate and the average design age of its
products. The Japanese firms led in both these areas and utilized a different
inter-project strategy from U.S. and European competitors, with much faster
transfers of designs among multiple projects. European firms had fewer new products
but newer designs, and increased unit sales per product ratio. U.S. firms did not
develop many new products or use new designs, and performed worst in the market.
Further work remains to be done in several areas regarding organizational
structure and process as well as new product development strategy. First, we intend
to explore what are appropriate organizational structures and processes needed to
implement different inter-project strategies. While concurrent design transfer
appears to be critical for superior rates of market-share growth among the Japanese
manufacturers, researchers have not yet examined coordination mechanisms between
different intra-firm projects. Second, although the concurrent design transfer
strategy of Japanese manufacturers was appropriate to increase market share, its
impact on economic factors such as sales generated per product or returns on R&D
investments remained to be examined. Other performance constructs that we intend
to explore include the impact of inter-project strategy on design quality as well as
manufacturing performance. Although these variables may affect market share
growth, it is important to establish theoretical linkages and test these with empirical
data. Finally, we intend to expand our data sample to include advanced engineering
components, primarily engines and transmissions, rather than focus only on platforms
and body styling to determine how "new" designs are as well how newness of major
components affect market performance and economic returns.
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Figure 1. Typology of the Inter-project Strategy
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Table 1. Regression Results for Cumulative Worldwide Market Share Growth
Dependent Variable=Market Share Growth
(Number of Sample=21)
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4
Constant .48 .47 .62*** .17
New Product Rate .29***
Replacement Rate .20** .18
Expansion Rate .23 .65
Change in # of Product Offerings -.21 -.31
Average Design Age -. 15" -. 16** -. 10
Average Intra-project Variations -.26 -. 24 -. 12
U.S. Manufacturers -. 89*** -. 44
European Manufacturers -.53*** -. 06
Japanese Manufacturers
Adjusted R-squared .38 .35 .40 .37
F 4.10** 3.65** 7.72*** 2.67*
Statistically Significant at: *** 1% Level, ** 5% Level, * 10% Level
Table 2. Comparison between U.S., European, and Japanese Manufacturers
Japanese U.S. European
Number of Manufacturers 7 3 11
Number of New Projects 122 40 61
New Product Rate*** 3.94 (.92) 2.27 (.92) 1.26 (.72)
Average Design Age(a)** 1.61 (.51) 2.97 (1.22) 1.29 (1.57)
Average Intra-project Variations 2.07 (.28) 2.22 (.81) 1.93 (.47)
Inter Project Relatedness Strategy
New Design*** .42 (.12) .36 (.19) .71 (.24)
Concurrent Design Transfer*** .23 (.13) .09 (.10) .05 (.07)
Sequential Design Transfer"** .14 (.09) .45 (.35) .15 (.14)
Design Modification .21 (.13) .11 (.10) .09 (.16)
Average Transfer Lag (Years)** 1.47 (.70) 3.46 (1.47) 2.78 (1.11)
Market Performance
Market Share Growth*** .62(.52) -.27(.16) .10(.27)
Change in Unit Sales/Product* -.16(.18) -.56(.23) .08(.51)
(Standard deviations are in parentheses)
Statistically Significant at: *** 1% Level, ** 5% Level, * 10% Level (one-way ANOVA )(a): Only Japanese and U.S. difference significant (t-tests)
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Appendix 1. Change Index of Platform Design
Change
Points
0:
1:
2:
Change
Points
0:
1:
2:
in Wheelbase and Treads
Both wheelbase and tread are the same
Only either wheelbase or tread are new
Both wheelbase and tread are new
in SusRension Design
Suspension system and design are the same; modification in geometry
Suspension system is the same, but design is new
Suspension system is new
If a sum of the points in both areas is three or more, platform design is defined as new.
Appendix 2. Distribution of Transfer Lag .
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